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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Amended Judgment entered by the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Ada County, Idaho (the "District Court"), Case No. CV OC 1219536, 
consolidated with Case No. CV OC 1406615. The Amended Judgment is in the amount of 
$2,929,383.31, and the District Court entered it on February 24, 2017. R Vol. I, p. 6101. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT, AND DISPOSITION 
On October 25, 2012, Appellant KDN Management Inc. ("KDN") commenced Case No. 
CV QC 1219536 by filing a complaint asserting a claim for breach of contract, and related 
claims, against Appellee WinCo Foods, LLC d/b/a WinCo Foods ("WinCo") and WinCo 
Holdings, Inc. R Vol. I, p. 35. KDN sought repayment on three invoices for concrete repair 
work performed, in the amount of $340,667.50, plus interest an attorney fees. R Vol. I, p. 45-46. 
On December 7, 2012, WinCo answered and counterclaimed against KDN, asserting that KDN 
had overbilled WinCo in the amount of approximately $769,000 for the concrete repair work 
WinCo performed. R Vol. I, p. 50, 68. 
On April 18, 2013, the District Court entered an order dismissing KDN' s claims against 
WinCo with prejudice. R Vol. I, p. 107. On February 7, 2014, WinCo moved for summary 
judgment against KDN on its claims. R Vol. I, p. 152. KDN did not oppose that motion. R Vol. 
I, p. 779. 
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On April 1, 2014, WinCo commenced Case No. CV OC 1406615, asserting claims 
against Kym D. Nelson ("Nelson"), SealSource International, LLC ("SealSource"), and KD3 
Flooring LLC ("KD3"). 1 R Vol. I, p. 843. Specifically, WinCo asserted a fraud claim against 
Nelson arising from her alleged participation in intentionally overbilling WinCo on three 
invoices. R Vol. I, p. 850. WinCo asserted a claim for breach of contract and related claims, as 
well as a claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, against Nelson, SealSource, 
and KD3, for overbilling. R Vol. I, p. 851-52. The District Court consolidated Case No. CV 
OC 1219536 into Case No. CV OC 1406615. R Vol. I, p. 1179. 
On May 5, 2015, WinCo filed an Amended Complaint against the Nelson Parties. R Vol. 
I, p. 1370. WinCo retained its previously-asserted claims, but also added an alter ego claim, 
against all the Nelson Parties. R Vol. I, p. 1381-83. On October 14, 2015, WinCo filed a 
Second Amended Complaint, seeking an increased amount of damages and adding a second 
claim for fraud and a fraudulent transfer claim, against Nelson. R Vol. I, p. 2666, 2675, 2680-
81. 
Although the case had been scheduled as a jury trial since its inception, and despite 
WinCo's prior stipulation to a jury trial and the Nelson Parties' motion, pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 39(b), for a jury trial, on November 20, 2015, the District Court scheduled a 
bench trial. R Vol. I, p. 22. The bench trial occurred on May 31, June 1-2, 6- 9, and 21-22, 
2016. R Vol. I, p. 28- 30. On October 5, 2016, the District Court entered Findings of Fact and 
1 This briefrefers to KDN, Nelson, SealSource, and KD3 collectively as the "Nelson 
Parties." 
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Conclusions of Law. R Vol. I, p. 5003. On October 14, 2016, the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of WinCo, and against each of the Nelson Parties, in the principal amount of 
$903,724.50. R Vol. I, p. 5063. On February 2, 2014, after granting WinCo's motion for 
attorney fees and costs, the District Court entered an Amended Judgment in favor of WinCo, and 
against each of the Nelson Parties, in the principal amount of$2,929,383.31. R Vol. I, p. 6071, 
6101. Also on February 24, 2017, the District Court denied the Nelson Parties' previously-filed 
motion for relief pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59. R Vol. I, p. 6071. The Nelson 
Parties filed their notice of appeal on April 7, 2017. R Vol. I, p. 6104. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Parties 
KDN was a Utah corporation that was incorporated in Utah on February 18, 2010. R 
Vol. I, p. 5007; Tr Vol. II, p. 2230 L. 178-p. 2231, L. 10 & Ex. 91. From February 18, 2010, 
until KDN's cessation, Nelson was KDN's sole shareholder and one of two directors. R Vol. I, 
p. 5007; Tr Vol. I, p. 1058 L. 11-16; Vol. II, p. 1344 L. 13-17. KDN was ans-corporation. Tr 
Vol. II, p. 1344 L. 10-12. On or about April 26, 2010, KDN received, from the Internal Revenue 
Service, notice of its acceptance as ans-corporation. Tr Vol. II, p. 2228, L. 7-18 & Ex. 515. 
Nelson intended that KDN conduct business, and that it interface with WinCo, under the trade 
name "KD Concrete Design." Tr Vol. II, p. 1355, L. 21-24. 
KD3 is a Utah limited liability company formed in 2006. R Vol. I, p. 5007; Tr Vol. II, p. 
1626, L. 15-p. 1627, L. 6 & Ex. 100; p. 2136 L. 7-9. From the date ofKD3's creation through 
2009 and 2010, Nelson was one of several members ofKD3 and its sole manager. R Vol. I, p. 
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1007; Tr Vol. II, p. 1627, L. 7-p. 1629, L. 20 & Ex. 100. KD3 is a labor company-it furnishes 
labor for concrete sealant and repair. Tr Vol. II, p. 1638, L. 17-22; p. 2098, L. 8-10; p. 2135, L. 
13-20. 
SealSource is a Utah limited liability company formed in 2002. R Vol. I, p. 5007. 
During 2010 and the majority of 2011, Nelson was a minority member of Seal Source, and she 
was not a manager of Seal Source. Tr Vol. I, p. 1144, L. 23- p. 1145, L. 3. SealSource is a 
distributor of concrete sealant and color materials used to protect and repair concrete. Tr Vol. II, 
p. 1648,L.22-p. 1649,L. 5. 
WinCo is in the business of "the sale of grocery items." R Vol. I, p. 5006; Tr Vol. I, p. 
726, L. 2-5. Although it is headquartered in Boise, Idaho, it has "operating stores and 
distribution centers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, [and] 
Texas." R Vol. I, p. 5006; Tr Vol. I, p. 726, L. 11-14. It has 16,000 employees working in 107 
stores. R Vol. I, p. 5006; Tr Vol. I, p. 722, L. 17-22. 
Although not parties to this proceeding, certain individuals performed key roles for 
WinCo. Tom Little ("Little") was a WinCo maintenance engineer stationed at WinCo's 
corporate headquarters from 2007 to 2011. Tr Vol. I, p. 775, L. 14-22. In that capacity, Little 
supervised the maintenance of all WinCo stores and was responsible for approving invoices from 
contractors who had performed maintenance work at WinCo stores, where those invoices were 
under $50,000. Tr Vol. I, p. 776, L. 20-p. 777, L. 7. If an invoice was in excess of $50,000, 
Little would ask certain individuals in management to approve and sign the invoice. R Vol. I, p. 
5016. One of those individuals was David Van Etten ("Van Etten"). Tr Vol. I, p. 777, L. 8-17. 
7 
Finally, beginning in and around 2006, Jim Douty ("Douty") served as a WinCo maintenance 
supervisor in Win Co's Boise, Idaho division. R. Vol. I, p. 50 IO; Tr Vol. I, p. 851, L. 12-p. 852, 
L. 8. In that capacity, Douty supervised the maintenance of all WinCo stores within his sphere 
of responsibility, including floor maintenance. Tr Vol. I, p. 853, L. 1-17. 
2. The Business Relationship Between WinCo and the Nelson Parties 
There was some history between Nelson and Win Co prior to the transactions that gave 
rise to this litigation. Specifically, prior to 2009, SealSource "suppl[ied] cleaning supplies, floor 
supplies to the [WinCo] stores." R Vol. I, p. 5007; Tr Vol. I, p. 783, L. 1-2. 
As that relationship progressed, WinCo and Nelson discussed whether Nelson's then-
business-either SealSource or KD3-could perform joint repair work at WinCo stores. R Vol. 
I, p. 5010; Tr Vol. I, p. 783, L. 3-13. Beginning in approximately September 2008, KD3 began 
seeking to obtain concrete joint repair work from WinCo by submitting a proposal, in its name, 
to WinCo. R Vol. I, p. 5010; Tr Vol. I, p. 783, L. 114-p. 785, L. 9 & Ex. 49; p. 1090, L. 24-p. 
1091, L. 12 & Ex. 41. Although it did not do so initially, KD3 later directed proposals to Little 
specifically. R Vol. I, p. 5011; Tr Vol. I, p. 785, L. 10-25 & Ex. 42. However, in December 
2009, Nelson informed WinCo that she intended to form KDN as the entity that would actually 
enter into the contract with WinCo for joint repair work. Tr Vol. I, p. 1074, L. 15-21. 
Furthermore, on or about January 21, 2010, Nelson again informed WinCo-specifically, 
Little-that KDN would be formed to enter into any contract with WinCo for joint repair work. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 1099, L. 17-p. 1100, L. 2. Negotiations proceeded, aimed at forming an agreement 
whereby KDN would perform joint repair services, as a general contractor, for WinCo stores. Tr 
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Vol 1, p. 1350, L. 10-p. 1354, L. 6. Those negotiations involved discussions regarding price, 
identification of the stores that would receive joint repair work, and a start date. Id.; R Vol. I, p. 
5011-12. 
Given those variables, Nelson deemed that an agreement had been reached when KDN 
actually commenced work actually commenced on a particular store. Tr Vol. II, p. 2112, L. 11-
p. 2113, L. 2. Nelson's belief that an agreement as reached was supported by the fact that 
WinCo retained the ability throughout the project to pull any store that it had previously 
identified as needing work. Tr Vol. I, p. 803, L. 2-9; Tr Vol. II, p. 2267, p. 8-25. And as of 
February 10, 2010, KDN still awaited a start date for work on any store. Tr Vol. I, p. 796, L. 2-
15 & Ex. 56. As noted above, Nelson formed KDN as a Utah corporation on February 18, 2010. 
R Vol. 1, p. 5014; Tr Vol. II, p. 1289, L. 21-23, Ex. 91. On February 16, 2010, KDN ordered 
material needed to perform the joint repair work. Tr Vol. I, p. 1107, L. 3-23 & Ex. 57. KDN 
commenced work on a WinCo store thereafter. Critically, prior to February 18, 2010-the date 
of its formation-KDN had performed no work of any kind on any WinCo store and received no 
payment from WinCo. Tr Vol. II, p. 1355, L. 15-18; p. 1355, L. 25-p. 1356, L. 1-3. 
Critically, KDN's contract with WinCo initially pertained to concrete joint repair work 
on only one store. KDN was required to obtain approval from WinCo to perform work on any 
additional store. Tr Vol. II, p. 2184, L. 4-p. 2185, L. 14 & Ex. 629. At most, WinCo's initial 
arrangement with KDN was for work on three stores, all of them in the Portland, Oregon area. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 2241, L. 10-18 & Ex. 626. That work was to be a trial period (the "Trial Period"). 
WinCo would retain KDN for additional stores in WinCo's Portland, Oregon, area and agree as 
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to terms (including identification of stores) at that time (the "Portland Agreement"), if Win Co 
was satisfied with KDN's work during the Trial Period. R Vol. I, p. 5012. The Trial Period 
evolved into the Portland Agreement, which encompassed KDN' s work on additional stores in 
the Portland, Oregon, area. R Vol. I, p. 5015; Tr Vol. II, p. 2358, L. 8-11. In tum, the Portland 
Agreement evolved into another, new and separate, agreement by which KDN would perform 
joint repair work for WinCo stores in WinCo's Boise, Idaho area (the "Boise Agreement"). Tr 
Vol. II, p. 2267, L. 8-13. KDN had not yet finalized the terms of the Boise Agreement even by 
May 3, 2010. Tr Vol. I, p. 871, L. 5-p. 872, L. 9 & Ex. 586. 
The testimony at trial was undisputed that WinCo did not believe that it ever contracted 
with Nelson personally. Little believed that WinCo had contracted with "KD Concrete," which 
he understood was a business entity and not Nelson personally. R Vol. I, p. 5012; Tr Vol. I, p. 
817, L. 5-13. He also did not believe that Win Co had contracted with either SealSource or 
KD3. Tr Vol. I, p. 816, L. 5-23. Little specifically referred to the business entity with which he 
dealt as "KD Concrete Design." Tr Vol. I, p. 829, L. 4-8 & Ex. 646. In fact, in a declaration 
filed in this case in October 2013, Little referred to both "KD Concrete Design, Inc." and "KDN" 
as the party with which Win Co had contracted, betraying his knowledge of both KDN' s name 
and its status as a corporation. Tr Vol. I, p. 822, L. 21-p. 924, L. 25 & Ex. 578. That 
designation could not have been accidental: although Little "wrote ... out" the declaration "to a 
certain point," WinCo's counsel "rewrote [the declaration] for [Little] to proofread and sign." Tr 
Vol. I, p. 825, L. 1-19. 
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For his part, Douty believed that WinCo had contracted with KD Concrete, which he 
understood was a division of SealSource. Tr Vol. I, p. 866, L. 2-8. Douty understood that KD 
Concrete was a separate business entity. Tr Vol. I, p. 876, L. 25-p. 877, L. 20. Douty cannot 
recollect why he believed KD Concrete was a division of SealSource, other than he "assumed 
that that was [Nelson's] company and that she hired out the labor." Tr Vol. I, p. 866, L. 11-p. 
867, L. 10 & Ex. 73. Although Douty saw emails referring to "KD3 Concrete Design," he 
simply assumed that that designation referred to KD Concrete because "the name of the entity 
doing the floor repair wasn't terribly material" to him, and that he "assume[ d] that [KD 
Concrete] was the company that was coming in to do the joint repair." Tr Vol. I, p. 875, L. 7-p. 
876, L. 11 & Ex. 593 and 517. 
Finally, Van Etten reviewed discovery responses issued by WinCo in this case. Those 
discovery responses either admit, or do not dispute, that KDN entered into a contract with 
WinCo to perform the concrete joint repair work at issue in this case. Tr Vol. I, p. 754, L. 20-p. 
758, L. 1. Van Etten was also aware of the decision by WinCo to assert a counterclaim against 
KDN, specifically, for breach of contract. Tr Vol. I, p. 751, L. 21-p. 752, L. 3. 
The takeaway is that nobody with boots on the ground at WinCo thought that WinCo had 
contracted with Nelson personally. All of them believed that WinCo had contracted with at least 
a business entity affiliated with Nelson. Little's declaration testimony indicates that he knew the 
name of the entity was KDN, and that it was a corporation. 
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3. KDN's Post-Trial Period Disclosure of Its Principal Status to Win Co 
After the inception of the Trial Period, but before the Portland Agreement and certainly 
before the Boise Agreement, Nelson and KDN continued to disclose KDN as the entity 
performing the work and Nelson's principal. 
On March 26, 2010, Nelson sent an email to Little asking if WinCo needed a tax 
identification number to facilitate payment for the joint repair work on the WinCo stores. Tr 
Vol. I, p. 1108, L. 7 -p. 1109, L. 4 & Ex. 65. On April 16, 2010, either Nelson or Karen 
Thompson ("Thompson"), an individual that performed work for KDN, sent an email to Marci 
Foster ("Foster"), of WinCo, from an email address denominated "kdnconcrete@gmail.com" and 
with a footer identifying "KD Concrete Design." Tr Vol. I, p. 742, L. 1-p. 743, L. 3. In that 
email, Nelson or Thompson asked Foster if WinCo required a W-9 form so that KDN's invoices 
(issued under the name "KD Concrete Design") could be paid. Tr Vol. I, p. 741, L. 15-p. 743, L. 
12 & Ex. 500. In that email, Nelson or Thompson stated that "[w]e are a new contractor doing 
work for WinCo." Tr Vol. I, p. 743, L. 6-12. Foster forwarded that email to Little and to Van 
Etten and asked them to confirm if "either of [them] know what this vendor is doing for us and if 
their invoices should be going through us or a General Contractor." Tr Vol. I, p. 741, L. 15-p. 
743, L. 12 & Ex. 500. KDN then received a letter, on WinCo letterhead, from Marcia Kaiser 
("Kaiser"), of WinCo, requesting the return of a completed W-9 form requesting a taxpayer 
identification number and certification. Tr Vol. II, p. 2246, L. 16-p. 224 7, L. 19 & Ex. 501. 
KDN returned, to WinCo (via Kaiser), a completed W-9 form identifying KDN and furnishing 
KDN' s tax identification number. R Vol. I, p. 5014; Tr Vol. I, p. 911, L. 5- p. 912, L. 5 & Ex. 
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688; Tr Vol. II, p. 2247, L. 21-25, p. 2255, L. 7-12. Also, on April 30, 2010, Nelson sent 
WinCo (via Kaiser) a copy of KDN's articles of incorporation. Tr Vol. II, p. 2260, L. 14-24. In 
connection with the furnishing of the W-9, Nelson, along with Thompson, again informed Little 
in April 2010 that "KD Concrete is KDN Management, Inc." Tr Vol. II, p. 2298, L. 7-p. 2299, 
L. 1. 
Although WinCo's policy and practice is to issue one payment without a signed, 
completed W-9 form on file, that is an exception limited to one payment; WinCo will not pay 
more than one invoice without a signed, completed W-9 form on file. R Vol. I, p. 5014. In fact, 
WinCo made substantial payments to KD Concrete following April 30, 2010. Tr Vol. I, p. 912, 
L. 20-p. 913, L.13. Therefore, at least by April 30, 2010, WinCo must have had KDN's signed 
W-9-identifying "KDN Management Inc."-on file. R Vol. I, p. 5014. 
These post-Trial Period disclosures make clear that, at the barest minimum, WinCo knew 
it was dealing with KDN prior to entering into the Portland Agreement and, certainly, the Boise 
Agreement. 2 
4. The Nelson Parties' Separateness and KDN's Operations as an S-
Corporation 
Out of each of the Nelson Parties, KDN was the entity that received and accounted for 
payment from WinCo for joint repair work and deposited those payments in a KDN bank 
2 At least one additional disclosure occurred. On or about July 27, 2010, KDN paid 
WinCo-via a check labeled "KDN Management Inc."-$4,883.00, with a memo line 
referencing that the funds were for "damaged produce," which involved produce allegedly 
compromised by the joint repair work at a WinCo store in Boise. Tr Vol. II, p. 2268, L. 1-19 & 
Ex. 642. 
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account. Tr Vol. II, p. 2005, L. 23-25; p. 2014, L. 9-p. 2016, L. 7 & Ex. 545. As noted above, 
KDN was ans-corporation-a key fact in analyzing its operations and its financial relationship 
with the other Nelson Parties.3 
For starters, and for the Court's context, the Nelson Parties were a lot more separate than 
the District Court's decision suggests. KD3, KDN, and SealSource were each separately 
organized in Utah. Tr Vol. II, p. 1808, L. 11-15 & Exs. 91, 93,100,689,559,562,681,690, 
and 691. KD3, KDN, SealSource, and Nelson each had separate bank accounts. Tr Vol. II, p. 
1624, L. 21-25; p. 1918, L. 16-21; p. 1213, L. 13-15 & Exs. 193, 194, 115. KD3, KDN, and 
SealSource also had separate bookkeepers. Tr Vol. II, p. 1805, L. 22-25; p. 1807, L. 1-5. They 
also each maintained separate QuickBooks files. Tr Vol. II, p. 1623, L. 9-19; p. 1625, L. 1-8; p. 
1809, L. 4-21. They also utilized separate accountants or tax preparers. Tr Vol. II, p. 1807, L. 
6-p. 1808, L. 1. KD3 and SealSource also utilized separate credit cards. Tr Vol. II, p. 1939, L. 
11-17. 
KD3, KDN and SealSource each filed separate tax returns. Tr Vol. II, p. 1808, L. 2-8 & 
Exs.203,204,205,375,377,379,382,383,385,387,540,541,542,543,544,545,546,547, 
3 At trial, WinCo offered the testimony of Karen Ginnett, CPA ("Ginnett") to render a 
conclusion that corporate formalities were not respected between Ms. Nelson and the Nelson 
Entities. By her own admission, Ginnett analyzed the books and records of the Nelson Entities at 
a higher standard than even an IRS audit. Tr Vol. II, p. 1791, L. 24-25; p. 1087, L. 1-8. Other 
than generally referring to "accounting standards" and "IRS standards," Ginnett could not 
articulate the applicable standard of review she relied upon when rendering her opinions. Tr 
Vol. II, p. 1793, L. 14- 22. Ginnett is not a licensed CPA in the state of Utah. Tr Vol. II, p. 
1797, L. 19-20. Ginnett had never analyzed an entity relative to veil piercing or alter ego 
claims, Tr Vol. II, p. 1799, L. 7-12, nor had she testified in any case that involved veil piercing 
or alter ego claims before, Tr Vol. II, p. 1979, L. 9- 23. 
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548,549,550,551, 552,553,554,555,564,565,566,567,568,569,566, and 567. Nelson also 
filed her own personal tax returns. Critically, because all three of the Nelson Party entities-
KD3, SealSource, and most importantly KDN, which was ans-corporation-were pass-through 
entities, Nelson paid the income taxes for the entities on her personal tax return. Tr Vol. II, p. 
1917,L.22-25;p. 1918,L. 1--4;p. 1920,L.9-16;p.2019,L.3-10&Exs.568,569,570. 
When WinCo issued a check to "KD Concrete Design," it would be deposited into 
KDN's bank account. Tr Vol. II, p. 2005, L. 23-25; p. 2014, L. 9-p. 2016, L. 7 & Ex. 545. 
Nelson did not transfer funds from KDN to any personal accounts. Tr Vol. II, p. 1911, L. 20-23. 
Rather, because KDN was organized as an s-corporation, Nelson understood that all income 
flowed to her personally, and that she was responsible to pay the tax obligation for income to 
KDN. Tr Vol. II, p. 1344, L. 18-p. 1345, L. 6. Based on the advice of her accountant, Mark 
Whittaker ("Whittaker"), Nelson understood that she could utilize KDN's funds for personal 
expenses so long as such payments were categorized as distributions. Tr Vol. II, p. 2039, L. 5-p. 
2040, L. 7. And Nelson and Whittaker attempted to properly book those expenses as 
distributions. Tr Vol. II, p. 2036, L. 24-p .2038, L. 7. Whittaker advised Nelson on how to 
categorize these expenses and expressed no concern to Nelson over how they were being booked 
in KDN's records. Tr Vol. II, p. 2040, L. 1-p. 2041, L. 9; p. 2042, L. 3-16; p. 2042, L. 22- p. 
2043, L. 2. If Whittaker questioned whether something was really a business expense, he would 
inquire further to see if there was a "reasonable explanation." Tr Vol. II, p. 2063, L. 7-p. 1360, 
L. 15. He did advise the characterization of certain expenses, where appropriate, as shareholder 
distributions. Tr Vol. II, p. 2064, L. 7-p. 2065, L. 15. Whittaker deemed Nelson "entitled" to 
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use KDN's money in this way because Nelson had already paid taxes on those funds. Tr Vol. II, 
p.2068,L. 14-p.2070,L. 18;p.2071,L. 15-22. 
Joel Christensen ("Christensen") served for periods of time as bookkeeper for KD3 and 
SealSource.4 Tr Vol. II, p. 1618, L. 22-p. 1619, L. 1. Christensen characterized himself as 
"pretty conservative" with respect to the classification of expenses as business or personal, and 
he "lean[ed] towards the personal expense side if there was any question." Tr Vol. II, p. 1645, L. 
13-22. According to Christensen, Nelson relied upon him "as the accountant to help her 
understand the accounting side and properly classify expenses and revenues and follow those 
rules." Tr Vol. II, p. 1621, L. 14-19. Christensen advised KD3 and Sealsource regarding 
general business expenses, accounting for travel expenses and vehicle business expenses. Tr 
Vol. II, p. 1640, L. 12-p. 1642, L. 19. He recollects "times where we went back and forth to 
make sure" that expenses would be classified correctly. Tr Vol. II, p. 1645, L. 4-9. 
KDN finished its work for WinCo in August 2010. Tr Vol. II, p. 2269, L. 23-25 - p. 
2270, L. 1-4. WinCo first asserted that KDN had overbilled WinCo on approximately May 4, 
2012, nearly two years later. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1529, L. 8-24 & Ex. 421. WinCo did not assert any 
legal claim against KDN, of any kind, until December 7, 2012. Tr Vol. II, p. 1344, L. 5-9. By 
that time, Nelson-having heard no formal grievances from WinCo-had utilized virtually all of 
4 Christensen worked with SealSource for a "short stint" in 2009, left, and returned in late 
2011. He worked there until April 2014. Tr Vol. II, p. 1619, L. 22-p. 1620, L. 6. During the 
time Christensen was not at SealSource, Jane Marriott, and then Corby Van Valkenburg, served 
as Seal Source's internal accountants. Tr Vol. II, p. 164 7, L. 23-p. 1648, L. 6. 
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KDN's funds. Tr Vol. II, p. 1916, L. 15-19. KDN ceased business in 2012. Tr Vol. II, p. 1916, 
L. 15-19. 
5. The Scheduling of a Bench Trial Rather Than a Jury Trial 
On November 3, 2015, the Nelson Parties filed an answer to WinCo's Second Amended 
Complaint. R Vol. I, p. 3232. That answer concluded with a section entitled "Reliance Upon 
Jury Trial Demand," and stating that "[t]he Nelson Parties hereby rely upon all prior demands for 
jury trial submitted by any party to this lawsuit." R Vol. I, p. 3245. 
On January 2, 2013, the District Court held a scheduling conference. R Vol. I, p. 4. 
Following that hearing, on January 9, 2013, the District Court scheduled a five-day jury trial, to 
begin on December 9, 2013. R Vol. I, p. 4. Dispelling any doubt, the District Court set the case 
for jury trial an additional/our times: on August 22, 2013, November 13, 2014, April 9, 2015, 
and November 20, 2015. R Vol. I, p. 7, 13, 15, 22. Critically, on November 12, 2014-a day 
prior to setting the case for jury trial for the third time-WinCo and the Nelson Parties filed a 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, signed by counsel for both sides. There, WinCo and 
the Nelson Parties stipulated to a "12 Person Jury Trial."5 
On August 14, 2015, during a hearing, the District Court and WinCo's counsel discussed 
WinCo's theory and suggested procedure for proving the Nelson Parties' liability. There, the 
following exchange between WinCo and the District Court occurred: 
5 This stipulation was inadvertently omitted from the record on appeal. Concurrently 
with this brief, the Nelson Parties file a motion to augment the record with this stipulation and 
supply it to WinCo for use in its response brief. 
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THE COURT: The way it would work is the court would submit the issue 
to the jury on an advisory basis as it relates to the piercing-
MS. MARTINSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: -and incorporate the jury's findings into its finding and 
conclusions as to piercing. And in order to do that, we would have to submit the 
issue ofKDN's liability at the same time, wouldn't we? 
MS. MARTINSON: Yes, I would agree with you on that one. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 122, L. 9-18. At the same hearing, WinCo asked the Court ifit should prepare jury 
instructions. Tr Vol. I, p. 147, Ll-2. 
During a November 20, 2015, hearing, the Nelson Parties, WinCo, and the District Court 
engaged in a lengthy discussion scheduling trial, as well as discussing the District Court's 
procedures and preferences for how to conduct a jury trial, particularly where WinCo asserted 
both legal and equitable claims. Tr Vol. I, p. 341, L. 22-p. 344, L. 14. The following exchange 
occurred: 
MR. JOHNSON: All right. May I also ask the Court's routine on 
equitable remedies like alter ego? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JOHNSON: Will the Court have the jury determine the facts relative 
to that and the Court then use those facts to determine the remedy or will the 
Court be the finder of fact as well. 
THE COURT: So the Supreme Court in Idaho has indicated on equitable 
issues that those are court issues, obviously. But the Court can use advisory 
findings by the jury to use as part of its findings. 
My practice is generally to use the jury is [sic] an advisory fact finder. 
Now, it's not a rule that's set in stone and, certainly, if there's a-I'll look 
at that issue, but that's my general preference. And we can talk about that as we 
bet [sic] closer. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 343, L. 21-p. 344, L. 14. At no time did WinCo raise any issue regarding the 
convening of a jury trial. Tr Vol. I, p. 343, L. 21-p. 344, L. 14. 
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On April 4, 2016, WinCo filed an objection to jury trial. R Vol. I, p. 3929. There, it 
argued that because no written jury demand had been filed, there could be no jury trial on 
WinCo's claims. Rather, WinCo's claims would be tried to the District Court. R Vol, I, p. 3929. 
According to the District Court's docket, that filing marks the first time in the course of the 
case-since October 2012-that WinCo had ever stated any inclination to have any kind of trial 
other than a jury trial. R Vol. I, p. 3-25. On April 29, 2016, the Nelson Parties filed a response 
to WinCo's objection. R Vol. I, p. 3947. Also on April 29, 2016, the Nelson Parties filed a 
motion seeking a jury trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b). R Vol. I, p. 3953. 
At a hearing held on May 5, 2016, the District Court conceded that it "was under the 
assumption that it was going to be a jury trial" and had "been for some long time." Tr Vol. I, p. 
350, L. 2--4. WinCo's counsel observed that on March 25, 2016, the District Court's staff had 
sent an email asking the parties whether the case would be tried to a jury or to the District Court. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 352, L. 13-16. At a separate hearing on March 30, 2016, WinCo's counsel 
"indicated that he thought that a jury trial would be acceptable to WinCo as well." Tr Vol. I, p. 
3 72, L. 3-6. The District Court was unable to locate the aforementioned stipulation by Win Co to 
a jury trial, and-ostensibly owing to the oppressive length and complexity of the case, neither 
WinCo nor the Nelson Parties could point the District Court to that stipulation either. Tr Vol. I, 
p. 370, L. 21-p. 371, L. 3. The Court granted WinCo's objection to the jury trial and denied the 
Nelson Parties' Rule 39(b) motion on the ground that, without a demand or a stipulation, "there 
are a lot of issues in this case that are equitable in nature" that "in large measure predominat[ e] 
here." Tr Vol. I, p. 372, L. 15-p. 373, L. 16. 
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IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court commit an error or law or abuse its discretion by deeming 
the Nelson Parties to have waived their right to a jury trial or, alternatively, by denying the 
Nelson Parties' motion for a jury trial, brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b)? 
2. Did the District Court erroneously impose personal liability upon Nelson, either 
on the ground that KDN constitutes an undisclosed principal or pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-
204, for all WinCo stores at issue? 
3. Did the District Court base its determination that the Nelson Parties are each alter 
egos of one another upon erroneous principles of law? 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Nelson Parties do not claim attorney fees on appeal. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
The District Court misapplied key legal principles that incorrectly altered the result at 
trial. For the following reasons, the Court should reverse the District Court on the following 
three grounds. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DEEMING THE 
NELSON PARTIES TO HA VE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, BY DECLINING TO CONVENE A JURY TRIAL 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 39(b). 
This Court will review the District Court's refusal to order a jury trial pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) for abuse of discretion. See City of Pocatello v. Anderton, l 06 
Idaho 370,373,679 P.2d 647, 650 (1984). "This Court's test to determine whether a trial court 
has abused its discretion consists of three parts: ' (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived 
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the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) 
whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.'" Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154 
Idaho 866, 869-70, 303 P.3d 225, 228-29 (2013) (quoting Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 
179, 219 P .3d 1192, 1195 (2009)). The Court reviews questions oflaw de novo. See State v. 
Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,865,264 P.3d 970, 972 (2011). 
As the following sections demonstrate, the District Court acted inconsistent with legal 
standards when it failed to recognize WinCo's stipulation to a jury trial. In the context of the 
Nelson Parties' Rule 39(b) motion, it also failed to appreciate governing Idaho law specifying 
that Rule 39(b) requests for jury trial are to be liberally granted, and it failed to appreciate the 
unique reality that the District Court and every party to this case anticipated a jury trial for over 
three years-owing, at least in part, to WinCo's own stipulation. The District Court's decision 
denied the Nelson Parties of their right to a jury trial. This Court should therefore reverse the 
District Court's refusal to convene a jury trial and remand to the District Court for proceedings 
consistent with that reversal, including a jury trial. 
1. The District Court Scheduled a Jury Trial Numerous Times Based on 
WinCo's Apparent Initial Stipulation and Explicit Subsequent Stipulation. 
The Court correctly observed that there is no written jury demand filed prior to the 
Nelson Parties' November 3, 2015, statement of "reliance." But there was, of necessity, a 
stipulation. "A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed." See 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(d). "When a jury trial has been demanded under Rule 38, the action must be 
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designated on the register of actions as a jury action." Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(a). In other words, in 
a civil case, a jury trial must be demanded, and a demand results in the action being designated 
as a jury action on the register of actions. It follows that if the action is designated as a jury 
action on the register of actions, there must have been either a demand or a stipulation to a jury 
trial. 
The District Court docket evidences this stipulation. On January 2, 2013, the District 
Court held a scheduling conference. R Vol. I, p. 4. The outcome of that scheduling conference 
was not reduced to a written order, perhaps contributing to some confusion. But a week 
thereafter, the District Court scheduled a five-day jury trial, to begin on December 9, 2013. R 
Vol. I, p. 4. The scheduling conference plainly resulted in a stipulation to a jury trial. The case 
was again set for a jury trial on August 22, 2013. R Vol. I, p. 7. 
Dispelling any doubt, on November 12, 2014, WinCo and the Nelson Parties did file an 
express, written stipulation to the convening of a "12 Person Jury Trial."6 Based ostensibly on at 
least that stipulation (if not an earlier stipulation), the District Court set the case for jury trial an 
additional three times: November 13, 2014, April 9, 2015, and November 20, 2015. R Vol. I, p. 
13, 15, 22. WinCo never objected. R Vol. I, p. 3-25. 
Furthermore, at no fewer than three hearings-August 14, 2015, November 20, 2015, and 
March 30, 2016-the parties discussed the convening of a jury trial with the Court, including its 
procedures and preferences for trying legal and equitable claims together. In fact, the March 30, 
6 Again, concurrently with this brief, the Nelson Parties move to supplement the appellate 
record with this stipulation. 
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2016, hearing was predated, by five days, by an email from the District Court's staff asking the 
parties whether the case was to be tried to a jury or to the District Court. On March 30, 2016, 
WinCo did not object to a jury trial, but rather stated its belief that a jury trial was likely 
acceptable to WinCo. 7 
That is why the Nelson Parties "relied" on the notion of a prior jury demand when they 
filed their response to WinCo's Second Amended Complaint-they thought, based on three 
years oflitigation aimed at a jury trial, that the case was to be tried to a jury. In any event, but 
particularly in this context, there is no material distinction between "demanding" a jury trial and 
"relying" upon a prior demand for-or the prior scheduling of-a jury trial. A jury demand must 
be in writing, "which may be included in a pleading," and served "no later than 14 days after the 
last pleading directed to the issue is served." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(b)(l). The Nelson Parties 
clearly did that: in their answer to WinCo's Second Amended Complaint, they stated, in writing, 
that they desired, expected, and anticipated a jury trial. R Vol. I, p. 3245. "Demand" is not a 
magic word. See Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that the requirement is simply that "the jury demand be sufficiently clear to alert a careful reader 
that a jury trial is requested on an issue," and that "[t]his approach allows a great deal of 
flexibility in how the request is made"); see also id. (although a request "certainly could have 
7 Specifically, the District Court stated that it had "looked at the transcript of [the March 
25, 2016) hearing" and observed that WinCo's counsel "indicated that he thought that a jury trial 
would be acceptable to Win Co as well." The District Court then discounted Win Co's admission 
by stating that it recognized "that he's not been lead counsel in this case and certainly hasn't 
been the decision-maker on those kind of important issues, fundamental issues." 
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been clearer, [it] did provide sufficient notice to the court and opposing counsel that [the 
plaintiff] wanted a jury trial"). The Nelson Parties plainly expressed their intent that all issues 
triable to a jury be so tried. They certainly did not offer "a voluntarily, intentional 
relinquishment of a known right or advantage" sufficient to qualify as a waiver, and WinCo 
certainly did not "act[] in reasonable reliance upon [such waiver] and ... thereby ... altered [its] 
position to [its] detriment." See Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,256, 846 
P.2d 904, 907. 
Win Co stipulated to a jury trial-either expressly or by its conduct of this case for three 
years. The Nelson Parties were entitled to rely upon WinCo's express or implied stipulation. 
2. Even If There Was No Express Stipulation to Try the Case to a Jury, the 
District Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying the Nelson Parties' Rule 
39(b) Motion. 
Even leaving aside WinCo's stipulation, these circumstances are precisely the kind of 
reason why Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) exists. Although "[i]ssues on which a jury trial 
is not properly demanded are to be tried by the court ... the court may, on motion, order a jury 
trial on any issue for which a jury might have been demanded." Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(b). "It is 
essential that, upon a request for a trial of issues by a jury, even after the time for demand for a 
jury has elapsed, that the trial court liberally exercise its discretion in this regard to carry out the 
designed purpose of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." R.E. W Cons tr. Co. v. Dist. Court of 
the Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426,443,400 P.2d 390,401 (1965) (emphasis added). One of 
the designed purposes of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedures is to preserve the right to a jury 
trial: "[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or as provided by a statute of the 
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state ofldaho is preserved to the parties inviolate." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(a). Courts 
construing the federal equivalent of Idaho's Rule 39(b) observe that Rule 39(b) motions "should 
be granted when the parties opposing the motion fail to present 'strong and compelling reasons' 
in support of their opposition." See, e.g., AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150, 
155 (10th Cir. 1965).8 More narrowly constrained applications of Rule 39(b): 
seem to place the emphasis in the wrong place. Technical insistence upon 
imposing a penalty for default by denying a jury trial is not in the spirit of the 
rules. The rules do not limit the court's discretion in ordering a jury in cases in 
which there would have been a right to jury trial. The court ought to approach 
each application under Rule 39(b) with an open mind and an eye to the factual 
situation in that particular case, rather than with a fixed policy against granting the 
application or even a preconceived notion that applications of this kind are usually 
to be denied. 
See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure§ 2334, at 115-116 (1971) (footnotes 
omitted). Courts should consider several factors in assessing a Rule 39(b) motion, including 
"whether the issues are more appropriate for determination by a jury or a judge," "any prejudice 
that granting a jury trial would cause the opposing party," "the timing of the motion," and "any 
effect a jury trial would have on the court's docket and the orderly administration of justice." 
8 See also Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Schs., 825 F.2d 1004, 1013 (6th Cir. 1987) (a 
court's discretion "should be exercised in favor of granting a jury trial in the absence of strong 
and compelling reasons to the contrary" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parrott v. Wilson, 
707 F.2d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 1983) ("In this circuit, the general rule governing belatedjury 
requests under Rule 39(b) is that the trial court should grant a jury trial in the absence of strong 
and compelling reasons to the contrary." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. 
Unum, Inc., 658 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1981) ("A motion for trial by jury submitted under Rule 
39(b) should be favorably received unless there are persuasive reasons to deny it."); Littlefield v. 
Fort Dodge Messenger, 614 F.2d 581,585 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[J]ury trials out to be liberally 
granted when no prejudice results."). 
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See Malbon v. Penn. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 636 F.2d 936,940 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1980); see also 
Daniel Int'! Corp. v. Fishchbach & Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990) (same). 
At least one court has already balanced these factors in almost the exact environment this 
appeal presents. In Pinemont v. Belk, 722 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reviewed a district court's denial of a Rule 39(b) motion where both the defendant and 
the Court believed that the case was to be tried to a jury and had prepared accordingly, only to 
learn at the pretrial conference that the plaintiff desired a bench trial and that no demand had 
actually been filed. See id at 235-38. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit observed that although the 
defendant could have perhaps more closely scrutinized the pleadings, the fact that "the district 
court had apparently been led to believe"-by the plaintiff, no less-"that the case was to be 
tried by a jury" was of "prime importance." See id. at 238. Because the court was already 
planning on a jury trial, granting the Rule 39(b) motion "would not have unduly affected the 
court's administration of its business." Deeming that case to be "uniquely characterized" by 
misleading statements from the plaintiff, the defendant's "good faith, and the district court's 
readiness up until a week before trial to try this case to a jury," the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the district court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 39(b) motion. See id. 
That is exactly what happened here. Regardless of whether a formal written demand for 
a jury trial was ever filed, both WinCo and the Nelson Parties litigated this case for over three 
years expecting to reach a jury trial. The Court expected a jury trial, too, and had calendared one 
five times. With those expectations squarely in place, WinCo cannot possibly have been 
prejudiced by trying its case to a jury, as it had always planned to do. And the Court's 
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administration would have sustained no impact, as it had scheduled a jury trial from the 
beginning of the case, including in November 2016. The timing of the Nelson Parties' Rule 
39(b) motion was more than fair. The Nelson Parties filed it immediately after WinCo stated, for 
the first time in over three years, that it didn't want a jury trial after all. And although the claims 
at issue contained some equitable claims (like alter ego and unjust enrichment), the majority of 
them-including WinCo's central claim-were legal in nature (breach of contract, personal 
liability, fraud, and violation ofldaho's Consumer Protection Act). The parties even discussed 
with the Court, on November 20, 2015, procedures for trying both legal and equitable claims. 
The rule is that a District Court should grant a Rule 39(b) motion unless there is a 
persuasive reason not to. Here, not only was there no such reason, but WinCo, the Nelson 
Parties, and the Court anticipated a jury trial until WinCo reneged on its stipulation at the 
eleventh hour. Even if there was no demand and no stipulation, the District Court still should 
have convened a jury trial pursuant to Rule 39(b), and it abused its discretion by failing to do so. 
This Court should vacate the judgment and remand to the District Court for a jury trial. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT NELSON IS 
PERSONALLY LIABLE IS BASED ON LEGAL ERROR. 
The District Court determined that Nelson was personally liable under the Trial Period, 
the Portland Agreement, and the Boise Agreement pursuant to theories of undisclosed principal 
and pre-incorporation liability. That determination is premised upon a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the facts surrounding, and the difference between, the three contracts. 
"Formation of a contract is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve." Inland 
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Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 702, 779 P .2d 15, 16 (1989). "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
52(a)(7). "[A] factual finding will not be deemed clearly erroneous unless, after reviewing the 
entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." County of Canyon v. Wilkerson, 123 Idaho 377, 381-82, 848 P.2d 435, 439--40 (Ct. App. 
1993). "[C]lear error will not be deemed to exist if the findings are supported by substantial and 
competent, though competing, evidence." Id. at 382, 848 P.2d at 440. 
However, to the extent the District Court misconstrued or misapplied legal principles, this 
Court reviews that misconstruction or misapplication de novo. See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 865, 264 
P.3d at 972. Here, the District Court's error was not so much in its facts, but in how it failed to 
appreciate how legal principles of contract formation govern and apply those facts. As the 
following sections demonstrate, the District Court erroneously applied those principles, and this 
Court should reverse that determination. 
1. The District Court's Definition of the "Contract" Between WinCo and KDN 
Is Contrary to Idaho Law Regarding an Indefinite Quantities Contract. 
The District Court missed the key distinction between the Trial Period, the Portland 
Agreement, and the Boise Agreement. They are different, and that difference has legal 
implications. 
Basic contract principles govern this issue. "Formation of a valid contract requires that 
there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. 
This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance." P. 0. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks 
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Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,238, 159 P.3d 870, 875 (2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). An enforceable contract also requires consideration, or "action by the promisee 
which is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise." See Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 
91 Idaho 605,607,428 P.2d 524, 526 (1967). "[T]o be enforceable, an agreement must be 
sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined what 
acts are to be performed and when performance is complete." Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home 
Loans, Inc., 143 Idaho 890, 892, 155 P.3d 691,693 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"[A] reservation to either party of an unlimited right to determine the nature and extent of his 
performance renders his obligation too indefinite for legal enforcement, making it, as it is 
termed, merely illusory." Thomas v. Cate, 78 Idaho 29, 32,296 P.2d 1033, 1034 (1956) (quoting 
Corthell v. Summit Thread Co., 167 A. 79, 81 (Me. 1933)). 
The District Court found that the Trial Period, the Portland Agreement, and the Boise 
Agreement were all one indefinite quantities contract, but that finding ignores these basic 
contract principles. The Trial Period permitted KDN to perform concrete joint repair work on at 
most three-and only three-WinCo stores. WinCo could pull any store from KDN's worklist. 
In other words, WinCo's promise was illusory until KDN actually commenced work. Just as 
Nelson testified, there was no agreement with WinCo until work actually started. And it is 
undisputed that that Trial Period work was intended to see how KDN would work out as a 
contractor. WinCo not only reserved the right to not permit KDN to work on additional stores, 
but WinCo had not yet even identified additional stores requiring concrete joint repair. The 
Portland Agreement followed only when KDN satisfactorily completed work on the three stores 
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the Trial Period contemplated, and WinCo elected to have KDN proceed with other, to-be-
determined stores. The Boise Agreement did not follow until after the Portland Agreement. 
The District Court misapprehended, as a matter of law, what an indefinite quantities 
contract is. It correctly recognized that, with such a contract, "the buyer must be obligated to 
purchase a minimum quantity in order for the agreement to be enforceable," and "without an 
obligatory minimum quantity, the buyer would be allowed to order nothing, rendering its 
obligations illusory and, therefore, unenforceable." R Vol. I, p. 5034 (quoting Torncello v. 
United States, 681 F.2d 756, 761 (Cl. Ct. 1982)). But the District Court incorrectly defined an 
indefinite quantities contract's enforceability. If an indefinite-quantities contract includes a 
guaranteed minimum quantity, the "proper remedy" is to enforce the guaranteed minimum 
quantity provision and "to sever the unenforceable provision"-the illusory promise to purchase 
an indefinite amount of goods in the future. See United Services Auto. Ass 'n v. Pelis, No. 51969-
7-I, 2004 WL 792666, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. April 12, 2004); see also Cummings-Reedv. United 
Health Group, No. 2:15-CV-02359-JAM-AC, 2016 WL 1734873, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2016). 
The parties then become legally obligated or accountable to each other for future purchases only 
upon the "contemporaneous exchange of consideration"-meaning, in this circumstance, new 
and definite promises to buy and sell. Cf TMC Worldwide, L.P. v. Gray, 178 S.W.3d 29, 37 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2005). In other words, parties may have an indefinite quantities contract, but only 
the portion of the contract that the parties have agreed to is actually enforceable-or, put 
differently, is actually a "contract." 
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With these principles in place, there were, at least, three contracts between KDN and 
WinCo: the Trial Period, the Portland Agreement, and the Boise Agreement. By definition and 
operation of law, the Trial Period did not start until WinCo's promise to permit KDN to perform 
work became irrevocable, and that did not occur until KDN started work. And most certainly, 
the Portland Agreement did not arise until KDN completed the Trial Period and WinCo 
authorized it to work on other stores. The same goes for the Boise Agreement. The District 
Court's contrary characterization of the KDN-Win Co contract fails to conform to established 
contract principles. 
2. The District Court's Determination that Nelson Is Liable to WinCo Under 
the Agreement Pursuant to an Undisclosed Principal Theory Is Premised 
Upon Legal Error. 
An agent will not be held liable on a contract if he discloses to the other contracting party 
that (1) the agent is acting for a principal and (2) the principal's identity. See Agrisource, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,908,322 P.3d 815, 820 (2014). The District Court found that Nelson 
"presented no evidence that she clearly and affirmatively disclosed to WinCo at or prior to 
January of 2010 that she was acting as an agent for a yet-to-be-formed corporation named "KDN 
Management, Inc. d/b/a KD Concrete Design," or even "KDN." R Vol. I, p. 5034. But that 
finding runs contrary to the principles articulated above. 
Although KDN was not formed as of January 2010, it was formed on February 18, 2010, 
prior to commencing any work for WinCo. As explained above, WinCo could have pulled out of 
the Trial Period right up to the day upon which KDN started work. Up until that day, any 
contract was illusory, meaning it lacked consideration-there was, therefore, no contract. It was 
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undisputed at trial that KDN commenced work after February 18, 2010. Therefore, KDN was 
properly formed prior to entering into the Trial Period. The District Court's characterization of 
KDN as a "yet to be formed corporation," as of the effective date of the Trial Period, violates 
these basic contract principles. It is certainly inaccurate as to the Portland Agreement and the 
Boise Agreement. 
Moreover, Nelson disclosed all she needed to disclose regarding her fully-formed 
principal. Even leaving aside Nelson's insistence that she disclosed KDN's precise name and 
corporate identity on two occasions, she indisputably disclosed the name "KD Concrete," that it 
was the name of a business entity separate from her, and that it was a corporation. Even Little 
identified "KD Concrete Design, Inc.," and "KDN," in his written, attorney-reviewed testimony. 
Douty also testified that he knew WinCo had contracted with a business entity, not with Nelson 
personally. WinCo admitted that it registered "KD Concrete" in its accounts payable software. 
And when WinCo subsequently received a W-9 listing "KDN Management Inc.," or issued a 
check to "KDN Management Inc.," it never protested that it had no idea who, or what, "KDN 
Management Inc." was. Without question, WinCo knew that it was dealing with a corporation, 
not Nelson personally. That is, quite literally, the only evidence on the record on that subject. 
Where WinCo knew that was contracting with a corporation, and not Nelson personally, 
whether it knew it was contracting with "KD Concrete" or "KDN Management Inc." is legally 
irrelevant. In Nadeau Painting Specialist, Ltd. v. Dalcor Property Management, Inc., No. 03-06-
00060-CV, 2008 WL 2777724 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008 July 18, 2008) (unpublished), the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant agent was personally liable on a contract because it made only a 
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partial disclosure of its principal. See id. at * 8. The plaintiff admitted that "sufficient evidence 
exists of its knowledge that [ the defendant] was representing the limited partnerships ... [but] 
conten[ded] that [the defendant] never disclosed the legal names of the limited partnerships." Id. 
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument. It observed that the defendant disclosed its "agency 
status" and that "each of its four principals would be responsible for payment." Id. at * 8-9. The 
court then held that "there is legally and factually sufficient evidence that [the plaintiff] had 
agreed to look solely to the limited partnerships for payment." Id. at *9. In other words, the 
point of the disclosure rule is to not to catch agents in technicalities; rather, it is to ensure that a 
party contracting with an agent receives the contract it intended. Requiring agents to disclose the 
exact legal name of their principal is "out-of-step with modern commercial realities." Id. at *9 
n.9. 
Idaho law does not distinguish between disclosing a business entity agent by its 
registered name versus the name under which it does business, and WinCo offered no evidence 
that the difference between "KDN" and "KD Concrete" mattered to it one whit. In fact, all the 
evidence presented at trial was to the contrary. Even assuming that Nelson disclosed "KD 
Concrete" rather than "KDN Management Inc.," WinCo knew that it was dealing with a 
corporation that was Nelson's principal, not Nelson herself. 
In any event, and at a minimum, there was no dispute at trial that Nelson disclosed KDN, 
by name, when she returned the W-9 form-especially given that WinCo would not have paid 
KDN anything beyond its first payment without a completed W-9 form on file. That occurred 
prior to commencement of the Portland Agreement, and certainly prior to the commencement of 
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the Boise Agreement. Given that the Trial Period, the Portland Agreement, and the Boise 
Agreement constitute two separate agreements, the District Court should have, at a minimum, 
cabined Nelson's personal liability under any undisclosed principal theory to the stores 
encompassed by the Trial Period, or, at most, the Portland Agreement. See Crosse v. Callis, 282 
A.2d 86, 91 (Md. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that even though a disclosure was "not made until 
after one contract had been entered into, the disclosure would be operative as to further contracts 
if fully made before such new contracts are consummated"). In no way could Nelson's personal 
liability encompass the Boise Agreement; WinCo plainly knew that it had contracted with KDN, 
a corporation, prior to entering into the Boise Agreement. 
The Court should reverse the District Court's determination that Nelson is liable to 
WinCo on an undisclosed principal theory. Alternatively, and at a minimum, it should cabin 
Nelson's liability under that theory to the stores encompassed by the Trial Period or, at most, the 
Portland Agreement. 
3. The District Court's Determination that Nelson Is Liable to WinCo Pursuant 
to a Pre-Incorporation Liability Theory Is Premised Upon Legal Error. 
Idaho Code§ 30-1-204 states that "[a]ll persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a 
corporation, when there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable 
for liabilities created while so acting." "[L]iabilities," as used in LC.§ 30-1-204, arise when a 
contract is executed-meaning when the parties become "legally obligated or accountable," not 
when the contract is breached. See Liability, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see e.g., 
Silvers v. R & FCapital Corp., 858 P.2d 895,897 (Or. App. 1993). 
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The District Court concluded that Nelson was personally liable (under, ostensibly, both 
the Trial Period and the Agreement) because she "contracted on behalf of KDN prior to its 
incorporation." R Vol. I, p. 5039. But again, the District Court's characterization of the Trial 
Period, the Portland Agreement, and the Boise Agreement ignores principles of contract law. 
The Trial Period did not commence until KDN started working. KDN was indisputably 
incorporated prior to that date. And KDN was plainly incorporated before embarking on the 
Portland Agreement and, certainly, the Boise Agreement. 
The Court should reverse the District Court's determination that Nelson is liable to 
WinCo pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-1-204. Alternatively, and at a minimum, it should cabin 
Nelson's liability under that theory to the stores encompassed by the Trial Period or, at most, the 
Portland Agreement-certainly not the Boise Agreement. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING 
THAT THE NELSON PARTIES ARE EACH ALTER EGOS OF ONE ANOTHER. 
"[I]ssues of alter ego and veil-piercing claims are equitable decisions." Wandering 
Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 591, 329 P.3d 368, 371 (2014). "In 
these cases, the trial court is responsible for determining factual issues that exist with respect to 
this equitable remedy and for fashioning the equitable remedy." Id. "This Court reviews the 
district court's rulings on equitable remedies for an abuse of discretion." Climax, LLC v. Snake 
River Oncology of E. Idaho, PLLC, 149 Idaho 791,794,241 P.3d 964,967. Again, an abuse of 
discretion inquiry asks: "(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
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consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." Goodspeed, 154 Idaho at 869- 70, 303 P.3d at 
228-29 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reviews questions of law de novo. See 
Schulz, 151 Idaho at 863 , 264 P .3d at 972. It reviews findings of fact for clear error. See Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 52(a)(7). Here, the District Court failed to appreciate principles of Utah law, as well 
as laws governing pass-through entities, and fashioned its equitable remedy based on those 
erroneous legal principles. This Court should reverse the District Court's alter ego 
determination. 
Utah law governs whether any of the Nelson Parties are alter egos of one another. See 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 3 07 ( 1971) ("The local law of the state of incorporation will 
be applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability to the corporation for 
assessments or contributions and to its creditors for corporate debts."); 17 William Meade 
Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corps. § 8326 (rev. ed. 2006) 
("[L ]iability of a shareholder for corporate debts and the extent and character of that liability are 
to be determined by the law of the incorporating state .... "). KDN is a Utah corporation, and 
KD3 and SealSource are Utah limited liability companies. Utah law therefore governs the 
Court's alter ego analysis.9 
9 Idaho's alter ego test is not materially different than Utah's. See Hayhurst v. Boyd, 50 
Idaho 752, 761, 300 P. 895, 898 (1931). 
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Utah law makes it difficult to pierce the corporate veil. Presumptively, Utah limited 
liability companies and corporations are entities separate and distinct from their members or 
shareholders. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-3a-l 04(1) ("A limited liability company is an entity 
distinct from its member or members."); Utah Code Ann.§ 16-lOa-622(2) ("Unless otherwise 
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder or subscriber for shares of a corporation is 
not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation solely by reason of the ownership of 
the corporation's shares."). Therefore, Utah courts authorize piercing a corporate veil only 
"reluctantly and cautiously." See Colman v. Colman, 743 P .2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Specifically, Utah courts are "extraordinarily reluctant to lift the veil in contract cases, such as 
this one, where the creditor has willingly transacted business with the corporation." See d'Elia v. 
Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, ,r 28, 147 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
That backdrop informs Utah's two requirements for piercing a corporate veil: 
(1) [ s ]uch a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the 
alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an inequity. 
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The second prong is 
defined as the "fairness prong," and to satisfy it, WinCo "cannot merely show difficulty in 
satisfying debt. ... Instead, [WinCo] must provide evidence of bad faith." See d 'Elia, 2006 UT 
App 416, ,r 30 ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
This is, above all, a contract case. The trial evidence clearly and unambiguously 
indicates that WinCo knew it was contracting with a business entity, not an individual. 
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Requiring WinCo to collect against a business entity, and not Nelson personally, cannot violate 
its expectations. See Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237,139,239 P.3d 308 ("[W]e see no 
injustice where Ottens was aware that the corporation had some involvement long before trial."). 
Moreover, the trial evidence clearly and unambiguously indicates that each of the Nelson Parties 
made required state filings, maintained separate bank accounts, filed separate tax returns, and 
maintained separate accounting records. 
The District Court based its determination of alter ego on its finding that "assets were 
meticulously siphoned off by Ms. Nelson and her other two companies, knowing KDN had a 
potential outstanding significant liability to WinCo." R Vol. I, p. 5051. But as a matter of Utah 
law, the movement of money among various parties is, in and of itself, insufficient to support a 
determination of alter ego. In Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39,284 P.3d 
630, the Utah Supreme Court held that "merely demonstrating that shareholders withdrew funds 
from corporate accounts is an insufficient basis on which to pierce the corporate veil absent 
additional evidence that the withdrawals were not legitimate or that the company failed to 
properly account for the withdrawals." See id. 127. A single question looms over WinCo's alter 
ego claim and the District Court's analysis of that claim: "Why did KDN spend all the money 
WinCo paid it, when KDN knew that it was liable to WinCo?" That question presumes that 
KDN (or Nelson) knew KDN was liable to WinCo, and that KDN had no right to spend income 
it had received from WinCo. Neither presumption is supported by any trial evidence. 
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1. Neither KDN Nor Nelson Knew of Its Liability to WinCo. 
There is no trial evidence supporting any determination that Nelson knew that KDN, or 
any other Nelson Party, had any liability to WinCo. Indeed, the District Court's own findings 
contradict such a determination. The District Court itself found that "Ms. Nelson has no 
personal knowledge regarding the accuracy of the measurements." R Vol. I, p. 5021. The most 
that can be said about Nelson is that she did not know whether the linear foot measurements 
were accurate. That may have been an example of poor business management, and it may result 
in a breach of contract, but it is a far cry from knowing that measurements were inaccurate, such 
KDN or Nelson could have expected WinCo to come knocking. Furthermore, knowing whether 
KDN' s linear feet measurements were inaccurate would form the basis of a fraud claim. See 
April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500,509,328 P.3d 480,489 (2014) (outlining 
elements of a claim for fraud, including "the speaker's knowledge of [ a factual statement's] 
falsity"). But WinCo did not bring a fraud claim alleging intentional overcharging on all WinCo 
stores. The only liability that KDN or Nelson could possibly have known about, based on the 
Court's findings, was liability arising from the Overbilling Fraud and the Weber Fraud, for a 
total of $25,042 in damages. Indeed, those are the only fraud claims WinCo brought. This is 
exactly why Utah's alter ego test requires a failure to adhere to corporate formalities to "sanction 
a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an inequity" for alter ego liability to attach. Without such 
fraud, injustice, or inequity, every breach of contract by a business entity would result in the 
personal liability of every principal of that entity. The corporate veil would disappear. 
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Furthermore, the trial evidence is clear WinCo did not raise overbilling concerns until 
May 4, 2012, when Win Co responded to KDN' s demand letter "in part by alleging that [KDN] 
had overbilled WinCo." Prior to that time, KDN had demanded that WinCo pay KDN 
$344,167.50. Consider that: until May 4, 2012, KDN thought WinCo owed it money, not the 
other way around. By the time KDN brought suit against WinCo in October 2012, KDN had 
already spent the money Win Co had paid it. None of the trial facts-including the District 
Court's own findings-support any suggestion that KDN and Nelson frittered away WinCo's 
payments as fast as they could before WinCo demanded reimbursement, knowing they had 
overbilled WinCo. Indeed, the opposite is true. 
2. Because KDN Was an S-Corporation, Nelson Was Justified in Utilizing Its 
Funds for Personal Use. 
As a matter oflaw, it was not improper for Nelson to use WinCo's payments to KDN 
for her own use. Nelson was KDN's sole shareholder, and KDN was ans-corporation. Where 
an entity is ans-corporation, its income "is treated as the personal income of the individual 
stockholder." See United States v. Rouhani, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1230 (M.D. Fla. 2015) 
(forfeiture case). Further, "in a Subchapter S corporation the shareholders may withdraw as 
much as the corporation's retained earnings account contains .... [I]t is not unusual for a 
Subchapter S corporation to make payments to family members or for family-owned vehicles. 
The relevant inquiry is whether those payments are charged to a shareholder's account and 
whether the shareholder is entitled to withdraw the amount, through his or her account, from the 
corporation." See Commercial Cabinet, Inc. v. Quint, 2003 WL 22962070, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
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Dec. 16, 2003) (unpublished disposition). As a matter oflaw, all things being equal, Nelson was 
fully authorized to draw as much of KDN's funds as she wished, so long as it didn't defraud 
anyone. And, as explained above, it didn't. 
The District Court discounted this principal on the ground that the stockholder of an s-
corporation "must withdraw the corporate income in the form of a salary and distribution and 
subsequently use the withdrawn funds for personal items." R Vol. I, p. 5050. "Treating the S-
corporation as a personal piggy bank and classifying personal expenses as corporate expenses 
presents a vastly different scenario." Id. The two cases the District Court cited for this 
proposition are inapposite here. Although in United States v. Rouhani, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1227, the 
court stated that the sole shareholder of an s-corporation "was entitled to take a salary and 
distributions" from the s-corporation, it did not speak to what amounts were appropriate for such 
salary or distributions, whether those amounts would have mattered in its analysis, or whether 
the manner in which the salary and distributions were accounted for was material. See id. at 
1230. Moreover, in Rouhani, the defendant was the sole shareholder of a company that 
employed forty-eight employees, and the defendant "determined whether and to what extent [the 
corporation] would pay its employees bonuses." See id. at 1229. The sole shareholder 
"purchased a number of homes for his family members with distributions from [the corporation] 
and continued to pay the tax and insurance costs on those properties," his family members "lived 
in the houses rent free," and the sole shareholder and his wife-and the corporation-"gave a 
$25,650.00 gift to [the shareholder's] church." See id. Strikingly, the court found no alter ego 
under these facts, even though the sole shareholder used the corporation, in the District Court's 
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parlance, as his "personal piggy bank." Politte v. United States, 2012 WL 965996 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 21, 2012) (unpublished), was a tax refund case. See id. at * 1. The s-corporation "operated 
between six and ten Midas franchise shops in the San Diego area." See id. The two plaintiffs 
were not the sole shareholders; they owned 74% of the s-corporation's issued and outstanding 
shares. See id. 
In contrast to those cases, KDN was a single-shareholders-corporation. Although Nelson 
sought to generate additional business for KDN, it essentially did one job: the WinCo job. That 
work concluded in August 2010. WinCo did not even begin to discover the purported 
overstatements-which, as explained above, with the exception of three stores, the District Court 
found were mere breaches of contract and not frauds-until November 2011, and it did not 
actually assert a claim against KDN for overpayment until late 2012. During that time, Nelson 
continued to keep money in KDN's bank account, even though it was in a business development 
phase and not actually doing additional concrete projects. Critically, Nelson also paid taxes on 
the income she received from KDN. The District Court rejected the significance of KDN as an 
s-corporation because it saw a distinction between Nelson causing KDN to pay personal 
expenses and Nelson causing KDN to distribute money to her personal account, and then paying 
personal expenses. But from WinCo's perspective, there is no difference-Nelson could have 
caused KDN to make herself a $1 million distribution in August 2010, and WinCo's concern 
would have been satisfied. None of these factors was present in either the Rouhani or Politte 
cases. And WinCo's and the District Court's point, if approved, would mean that a single-
shareholder s-corporation must wait until the statute of limitations on all potential liabilities has 
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expired before distributing any money-otherwise, the distribution is tantamount to the 
shareholder taking money from the s-corporation with pending liabilities. That is an inequitable 
and unrealistic outcome. 
Assume all of the Court's findings regarding Nelson's "siphoning" are true: Nelson drew 
funds from KDN to pay for the birthday parties of nieces and nephews, personal foreign exotic 
travel, elaborate family vacations, cars, personal credit card payoffs, personal gifts, and house 
payments. As a matter of law, she was allowed to. She did it before WinCo articulated even a 
single concern about KDN's billing. The District Court too readily discounted this important 
point. 
The Court should reverse the District Court's determination of alter ego as against 
Nelson. It should reverse that determination as against KD3 and SealSource for the same 
reasons. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Nelson Parties were entitled to a jury trial, and both WinCo and the Court expected 
one. Even leaving aside that enormous deprivation, the District Court's determinations of 
Nelson's personal liability and the Nelson Parties' alter ego ignored key principles oflaw. For 
these reasons, reasons, the Court should vacate the District Court's judgment and reverse for 
further proceedings consistent with the Nelson Parties' arguments, including jury trial. 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
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Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.1 is filed separately. 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
By:~~ 
StacyJ.McNeill 
Barry N. Johnson (admitted PHV) 
Daniel K. Brough (admitted PHV) 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 30th day of October, 2017, I caused two copies of the foregoing 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS KDN MANAGEMENT INC., KYM D. NELSON, 
KD3 FLOORING LLC, AND SEALSOURCE INTERNATIONAL, LLC to be served via 
U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Scott D. Hess 
A. Dean Bennett 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1750 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
D. Gary Christensen, P.C. 
Stacey A. Martinson 
Alexander M. Naito 
MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN LLP 
3400 U.S. Bancorp Tower 
111 S.W. Fifth Avenue 
Portland, Oregon 97204 
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